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In January 1950, the foreign ministers of the Commonwealth countries – 
Australia, Britain, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, and South Africa – met 
in Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) to discuss growing issues in Asia. This conference 
would mark the beginning of the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development 
in South and Southeast Asia. Canada’s enthusiasm for the plan lagged at the start. In the 
14-month decision-making process, from January 1950 to February 1951, Canadian 
policymakers considered entry into the Colombo plan with caution. They refused to agree 
before discussing the complications the Plan might pose to UN efforts and the financial 
strain it would impose. Eventually, Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, and R.W. Mayhew, Minister of Fisheries, persuaded the Cabinet that 
humanitarian responsibilities, the need to halt the communist threat, the benefit to the 
Canadian economy, and American involvement gave reason enough to contribute. This 
combination of political, economic, and humanitarian motives eventually convinced the 
Cabinet to join the Plan in 1951. The decision marked the beginning of direct bilateral 
assistance in Canadian foreign policy. 
The post-war era brought with it new methods of achieving foreign policy 
objectives for Canada. It challenged Canadians to accept a larger role on the world stage, 
emerging from the shadows of Britain and the United States. These changes coincided 
  
with the succession of Louis St. Laurent as Prime Minister, leaving Lester B. Pearson to 
succeed him as the Secretary of State for External Affairs.  Both men believed that 
internationalism was the best approach. Though St. Laurent expressed great interest in 
foreign policy matters, he avoided playing a prominent role and left much of the work to 
Pearson and his officials.1  A new generation of realist internationalist policy-makers – 
including Escott Reid, Arthur Menzies, and Douglas LePan – emerged. Their focus lay 
on shifting from pre-war isolationism to assist with Europe’s reconstruction, the 
reordering of the Canadian military, and adapting to the new Cold War structure. 
Exercising Canada’s new status as a middle power became a main priority. Yet labelling 
this period the ‘golden age’ in Canadian foreign policy must not be based solely on a 
Eurocentric perspective.  Canadian involvement grew not only in North America and 
Europe but also in Asia. In the post-war era, many problems in Canadian foreign policy 
shifted their roots from Europe to Asia. A new relationship emerged; one that can be 
identified by studying the ‘golden age’ of Canadian diplomacy. The Colombo Plan is one 
such example of an increased Canadian presence and interest in Asia.  
The evolving Canadian approach to foreign policy occurred at a time when 
international tensions were increasing in Asia. A growing sense of nationalism was 
spreading throughout the continent, spurring the independence of a number of colonies.  
India, Pakistan, and Ceylon achieved relatively stable independent governments, yet 
Burma’s fight for independence resulted in civil war. Indonesia finally achieved 
independence from the Dutch. The French were attempting to re-establish control in 
Indochina and conditions there would only worsen in the coming years. Rumblings in 
                                                 
1
 Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O’Reilly, eds. Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy. 
(Landham: Lexington Books, 2006) p. 35. 
  
Korea presaged the beginning of the Korean War, and the defeat of the Chinese 
Nationalists made the threat of communism all the more pressing. It was against this 
backdrop that the Commonwealth foreign ministers met for the first time in Colombo, 
Ceylon. 
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee proposed the idea for the Conference as a 
forum for discussing issues flowing from Asia, such as the recognition of China, the 
peace treaty with Japan, the situation in Indochina, and the Burmese civil war.2  The 
official agenda made no mention of economic development, much less of aid. Prime 
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King had resolutely opposed the idea of deepening 
Commonwealth relations, but his successor St. Laurent was open to the idea, especially 
considering that he had no desire to be seen as too closely tied to the United States. Thus 
Pearson in External Affairs found himself, along with Escott Reid, Deputy 
Undersecretary for the department, and Arthur Menzies, Head of the Far Eastern 
Division, flying across the Mediterranean and the Middle East in an RCAF Northstar, 
with Ceylon as their final destination.3 
Foreign Ministers were not the only ones travelling to Ceylon at the beginning of 
1950. The sterling crisis had given finance ministers reason for concern, and prompted a 
separate conference of Commonwealth finance ministers that would meet in Ceylon at 
the same time as the foreign ministers.4 The sterling bloc, a collection of Commonwealth 
countries that used the pound sterling as their international unit of account, faced an 
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economic crisis. Britain had borrowed heavily from these countries during the war and 
could not afford to pay its debts. India was one of the hardest hit countries and was in 
desperate need of US dollars to pay for imports from non-sterling nations. The 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers initially met in London in July 1949 to discuss the 
sterling crisis, and agreed to increase exports to dollar markets and cut dollar imports by 
25 per cent.5 As a country that relied heavily on trade with other Commonwealth 
countries, Canada was concerned by the idea of trade restrictions. Canadian officials 
attended the Tripartite Economic Conference along with Britain and the United States in 
Washington in September 1949, and realized that in order to mitigate the problem, the 
rest of the sterling area had to be involved in the discussions in an even more 
authoritative forum than regular committees in London.6 This meant that both foreign 
ministries and finance ministries were involved in the Colombo Conference from the 
start, setting the stage for even more detailed economic discussion. 
The conference began in January 1950 as two separate meetings, one upstairs 
with the foreign ministers, and the other downstairs with the finance ministers.7  Upstairs, 
Gulam Mohammad, Pakistan’s minister of finance, and D. S. Senanayake, the Prime 
Minister of Ceylon, both spoke of the necessity of economic development in their 
opening remarks. They introduced the matter gradually but never fully elaborated on it. 
Development did not become a full topic of discussion until Pearson suggested that the 
two conferences could gain through cooperation. Before the first week was over, the two 
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meetings had appropriately come together in a room halfway up the staircase joining the 
two levels.8  
The first meeting of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers ended with the 
presentation of a joint memorandum by the Australian, New Zealand, and Ceylonese 
governments, which would form the basis of the Colombo Plan.9 Pearson listened 
attentively to Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s closing speech, in which he stated that 
democracy in India was threatened from two sides: “first by a direct onslaught by 
communism; and secondly by an internal weakening, largely due to unfavourable 
economic conditions in which communism would flourish.”10 Pearson left the conference 
convinced that aid should be carefully considered, though not without first being 
“scrutinized by economic advisors so that any ambiguities of working not be 
misleading.”11 Pearson saw the need for aid but was wary of being drawn into an 
agreement that he did not completely support. 
Pearson’s cautious approach was evident throughout the conference. In his 
opening statement, he stipulated that Canadian participation in discussions did not mean 
that the government agreed to or accepted proposals for further cuts to Canadian 
imports.12 Pearson was also eager to expand the initiative beyond just the Commonwealth 
by involving the United States.13 He urged the committee to make use of existing UN 
resources and specialized agencies instead of reinventing the wheel. Pearson was even 
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wary of the type of technical assistance that was provided, arguing that, “ordinary hand 
pumps may be more suited to some regions than vast irrigation works; and ploughs may 
be more needed than tractors.”14 Evidently, Pearson himself identified some of the main 
criticisms of the Plan that Cabinet would debate for the next fourteen months. He did not 
want to see UN aims undercut and would have been more comfortable if US support had 
been secured earlier. Pearson did not want to assume leadership in any initiative if other 
countries had not already given their full support. The fact that Canada was the only non-
sterling country made him event more hesitant; he was aware of Canada’s need to protect 
its resource currency. The British hoped that an increased flow of US dollars would 
alleviate the stress placed on their own financial predicament, yet it was clear that Canada 
alone could not supply the amount required. Above all else, Pearson avoided committing 
to the proposals at first in order to protect Canadian national interests. 
Pearson was swayed by the humanitarian arguments supporting aid. His visit to 
Asia profoundly affected his worldview and allowed him to put a human face on the 
extreme poverty in Asia.15 As he would later declare in the Pearson Report, the clear 
purpose of international aid is to “reduce disparities and remove inequalities…so that the 
world will not become more starkly divided between the haves and the have-nots, the 
privileged and the less-privileged.”16 This altruistic vision of aid was certainly influenced 
by his experiences in Ceylon. He used the conference as an opportunity for a round-the-
world trip, allowing him to gain a clearer understanding of the problems facing other 
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Eastern countries.17 He saw first hand the economic difficulties and poor living standards 
that afflicted people in India and Ceylon and recognized that the concentration of wealth 
remained in a few hands.18 In Pakistan, he witnessed the issues stemming from the 
partition with India and the Kashmir conflict.  The three days spent in New Delhi and 
surrounding villages alerted Pearson to the desperate need for social reform in South 
Asia.19 Ultimately, he gained a greater understanding of the obstacles to be overcome 
before the people of South Asia and Southeast Asia could obtain a higher standard of 
living. 
Perhaps if every Canadian cabinet minister had seen what Pearson had during his 
travels in Asia, their support of the Plan would have been greater. Yet as it stood, most 
ministers had little knowledge of Asia and easily dissociated themselves from the 
humanitarian aspect of aid. Pearson presented a preliminary report of the conference to 
Cabinet on February 22, 1950. He made it clear that military force alone would not 
prevent the spread of communism in Asia, and that economic development must also be 
supported.20 He proposed that Canada join the Consultative Council initiated by 
Australia, New Zealand, and Ceylon. While Pearson was now convinced of the necessity 
of the Colombo Plan proposals, Cabinet clearly was not. St. Laurent wanted to know the 
opinions of UN officials before making any definite decisions, while Minister of Finance 
Douglas Abbott wanted to be assured that aid would not simply be spent on military 
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expenditures.21 Cabinet passed the matter of discussing early recommendations of the 
Colombo Plan on to the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy (ICETP), 
chaired by Norman Robertson. 
The ICETP was tasked with examining the recommendations of the Consultative 
Committee and determining their feasibility for Canada. Given the nature of the 
committee, the matter was viewed from a distinctly trade and economic perspective, and 
not with the concept of aid in mind.22 Clifford Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance, and 
Graham Towers, Governor of the Bank of Canada, were strongly opposed to Canadian 
contributions. The Canadian government had just recently committed to the UN, NATO, 
and peacekeeping efforts in Korea, all of which were substantial financial investments. 
They feared that an aid plan would put unnecessary strain on already scarce resources.  
The ICETP felt that Canada should send an observer, not an official delegate, to the next 
meeting of the Consultative Committee in Sydney.23 This decision was overruled, partly 
because Pearson had already made a public statement assuring Australia that a Canadian 
delegate would be present and partly because Canadian involvement could encourage US 
participation in the program as well.24 
Cabinet was also concerned that the Kashmir conflict would undermine the 
effects of aid in the region. India was spending 60 percent of its budget on defence, and 
critics of the Plan believed that aid would have a small impact given the seemingly larger 
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priorities of the Indian and Pakistani governments.25 Yet this was refuted with the support 
of the Minister of Citizenship, who pointed out that it would not be prudent to take any 
actions that would suggest indifference by Canada to the economic welfare of South- and 
Southeast Asia, and John Deutsch, who assured Cabinet that ratification of the report did 
not automatically mean adoption of the financial burden.26 Grudgingly, and only because 
they knew that the commitment was minimal, Cabinet ratified the Colombo resolution in 
March 1950 and accepted full membership on the committee.27  R.W. Mayhew, Minister 
of Fisheries, was selected to lead the Canadian delegation to the meeting in Sydney with 
Douglas LePan as his advisor since Pearson was attending a NATO meeting in London at 
the time. 
Despite the Cabinet’s acceptance of membership in the Consultative Committee, 
the Canadian delegation remained cautious in their commitment to direct economic aid.  
Mayhew had strict instructions to “carefully avoid at this stage committing the Canadian 
Government in any way, either directly or by interference, to extending financial 
assistance to the countries of South- and Southeast Asia.”28 The Australian Foreign 
Minister, Percy Spender had conflicting ideas. Initially, he had personally invited Pearson 
to the conference and assured him that Canadian attendance would not mean 
commitment. He maintained that he was simply encouraging Canadian involvement in 
the hopes of persuading the US to get on board. Yet once all the delegates had arrived in 
Sydney, Spender quickly changed his attitude. He immediately proposed the formation of 
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a concrete organization that would be financed by the Commonwealth governments.29  
This was in clear opposition to stated Canadian interests. Mayhew was firm on his stance 
and refused to make a commitment until he had a full set of facts.30 With only Pakistan 
supporting the Australian position, Spender was forced to modify his proposal to include 
only an offer of technical assistance. It was also suggested that the assistance be 
organized bilaterally, eliminating the need for a central fund or council.31 
The conference concluded with a proposal to have each Asian country create a 
six-year economic development plan by September 1, 1950, which would be presented at 
the next meeting of the Consultative Committee in London. Despite the rift between 
Australia and other Commonwealth countries, the final communiqué showed that the 
Sydney meeting had made definite progress. Immediate technical assistance would be 
offered bilaterally and a Standing Committee on Technical Assistance was created to 
organize technical assistance amounting to £8 million.32 Non-Commonwealth countries 
would be invited to join the committee at their next meeting in London.33  
Mayhew returned to Ottawa with a positive impression of the conference and 
proposed to Parliament that Canada assist with the provision of technical assistance. He 
suggested that Canada contribute half a million dollars per year. On June 12, Cabinet 
authorized $400,000 to be contributed for one year on the condition that it did not overlap 
with existing UN initiatives.34 
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It was evident that the British were key to the success or failure of the Colombo 
Plan and Cabinet initially chose to take whatever action they did.35 Once Britain had 
decided to become full members, Canada followed suit. In fact, Escott Reid did not think 
it would have been possible for Pearson to convince the Cabinet that the plan was a good 
idea had it not been for the fact that it was a Commonwealth scheme that would benefit 
its newest members: India, Pakistan and Ceylon.36 The fact that in 1950, Asia represented 
all of the non-white Commonwealth countries made it easy to use imperial rhetoric to 
mobilize efforts to help the Commonwealth.37 Yet it was also glaringly apparent that 
Canada could not supply the dollar aid alone. American involvement was imperative. The 
US was ambiguous about the amount of aid they were willing to contribute, although the 
U.S. State Department expressed interest in the draft report of the Plan in September 
1950. At the end of the London conference, where the Colombo Plan for Cooperative 
Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia was officially drafted, the key 
players were hesitant to make any firm financial contributions. Canada was clearly 
waiting to see what decisions would be made by Britain and the US before taking action. 
In cabinet, the debate was far from over. It would take them the following five 
months, from September to January, to reach a conclusion about their contribution to the 
Colombo Plan. Uncertainty about the aims and purpose of aid programs was a large 
concern for the Canadian government.38 Douglas Abbott argued that the Colombo Plan 
was duplicating the efforts of the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical 
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Assistance (UNEPTA).39 Having just committed to the UN, it seemed foolhardy to invest 
in other mechanisms that would be achieving the same end.  Financial commitments to 
NATO continued to increase in light of rearmament.40 It was finally decided that one-
fifth of the amount allotted to the Colombo Plan would be reallocated to the UN and 
officials were encouraged to continue efforts to merge the two programs.41 St. Laurent 
was especially concerned by the overlap in goals between the Colombo Plan and existing 
organizations, and certainly questioned whether or not the UN could deliver technical 
assistance more effectively. 
Though both Pearson and LePan’s personal views supported the idea that the 
Colombo plan should be motivated my humanitarian factors, Pearson chose to emphasize 
the threat of communism as a leading motivator on public record.42 “There is no more 
important question in the world today,” Pearson proclaimed, than the possibility that 
“communist expansionism may now spill over into southeast Asia.”43 Containing Soviet 
communism within its borders and fortifying Asia against encroachment was paramount.  
The North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950 made this all the more clear, 
demonstrating just how vulnerable the foundations of democracy were in the East. Keith 
Spicer asserted in 1961 that “however smug and clever Canada’s rationalizations for aid 
became in the later years, it is well to recall that the Colombo Plan crystallized essentially 
to stop the Red and Yellow Perils.”44 At the consultative committee meeting in London in 
September 1950, the importance of foreign aid in the promotion of democratic stability 
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was pushed to the forefront.45 The end result of the conference was a recommendation 
that Canada contribute $25 million annually, an increased amount that was proposed in 
light of the increase in security concerns.   
Even considering the communist threat and the Korean War, this $25 million 
proposal was met with opposition from Cabinet. St. Laurent’s support was “at best 
lukewarm.”46 Pearson, however, convinced him to change his mind. Pearson wrote to St. 
Laurent the day before Cabinet met to decide on the issue and argued that the Colombo 
Plan provided the opportunity to facilitate better Indian-American relations.47 As an avid 
supporter of internationalism and Canada’s role as linchpin in international relations, St. 
Laurent was convinced. Pearson also correctly assumed that St. Laurent would want to 
discuss the Plan in a positive light at the upcoming meeting of Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers.48 Pearson’s speech in the House of Commons on February 21 also highlighted 
the ongoing discussions with India regarding the purchase of Canadian wheat with the 
funds provided as part of the Colombo Plan.49 This wheat deal was integral in convincing 
Cabinet that aid would have economic benefits not only for the recipient countries but for 
Canada as a donor country as well. Aid would stimulate global economic growth, which 
would in turn stimulate Canada’s own export-led economy.50 Pearson’s arguments were 
enough to sway St. Laurent, Abbott, and the other harshest critics. On February 7, 
Cabinet finally approved a Canadian grant of $25 million for 1951-1952, on the condition 
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that other member countries hold up their end of the bargain.51 Pearson wasted no time in 
mentioning that “Canadians, as individuals – and this has been clearly reflected in the 
press from one end of the country to the other – wish to contribute to the success of this 
plan. The desire of the people of Canada, to extend assistance, has also been clearly 
shown in the debate on the speech from the throne.” He recognized that public opinion in 
Canada was almost unanimously supportive of assistance to the Colombo Plan, a fact that 
Cabinet could not ignore.  
The role of the US had also been an important factor in Canadian decision-
making. The US State Department had seemed favourable at first, and President Harry 
Truman had identified aid to Asia as an important part of his foreign policy in 1949.  The 
US was even more cognizant of the threat of communism than Canada was, making 
support of democratization in the East a strong priority. It was clear that the setup of the 
Marshall Plan – designed for a country with a devalued currency decreased trade and 
shortage of capital and consumer goods – would not be effective in underdeveloped 
Asia.52  Technical assistance was the answer, and the US had the financial capacity to 
support it.   
On December 12, 1950, the US agreed to participate in the Colombo Plan on the 
condition that other governments would announce their contributions. This step was 
enough for Canada, and although the exact amount of the US contribution had not been 
revealed, it was enough to persuade Cabinet to approve the Canadian contribution to the 
Plan for the first year, with future contributions to be determined later. US involvement 
was evidently a decisive factor in the cautious Canadian approach to the Plan, although 
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Pearson attempted to argue in Cabinet that Canada was fully capable of taking a different 
course and sticking with the Commonwealth.53 However, the timing of Canada’s final 
approval of the Colombo Plan says otherwise. It was not until the US had made a formal 
commitment that Cabinet was willing to commit a dollar amount.  
It took over a year for the Canadian government to consider the implications of 
the Colombo Plan. The divisions in Cabinet between the old guard of the King era and 
the newer MPs prolonged the debate. Pearson supported the Colombo Plan, though 
initially he was only willing to consider its proposals, not commit. A clear shift in the 
opinion of the Canadian Cabinet can be traced throughout the fourteen months of 
deliberations. Ministers were cautious at first, not wanting to commit Canadian taxpayers 
money to a scheme that might compete with existing UN activities. Though LePan 
believed that humanitarianism was the underlying motivator, the official sources provide 
another view. Many officials, such as Pearson, were personally moved by the plight of 
Asia. Yet individual ethics cannot be confused with larger government objectives. The 
major factors that influenced Canada’s decision to support the Colombo Plan were the 
Korean War and Cold War security concerns, the involvement of the United States and 
Britain, and the fact that supplying aid could in fact benefit the Canadian economy 
through wheat trade with India.  These benefits became apparent only in the latter half of 
the discussions. Up until then, there was strong opposition from members of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on External Foreign Trade, as well as other members of 
parliament who were wary of new financial commitments to countries on the opposite 
side of the globe. Pearson and Mayhew took a cautious approach to negotiating the Plan 
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and were slow to commit to anything that was not clearly in Canadian interests, 
especially when not all the facts were presented and all options explored. Only when the 
clear benefits to Canada became evident did they fully endorse the Plan and manage to 
persuade Cabinet to support it as well. It is pleasant to believe that Canada began its 
legacy of bilateral international aid during its ‘golden era’ of diplomacy because of 
humanitarian concerns.  Although these played a supporting role, the main reasons for 
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